/*
* @(#)RuntimePermission.java 1.53 04/04/20
*
* Copyright 2004 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved.
* SUN PROPRIETARY/CONFIDENTIAL. Use is subject to license terms.
*/
package java.lang;
import java.security.*;
import java.util.Enumeration;
import java.util.Hashtable;
import java.util.StringTokenizer;
/**
* This class is for runtime permissions. A RuntimePermission
* contains a name (also referred to as a "target name") but
* no actions list; you either have the named permission
* or you don't.
*
* <P>
* The target name is the name of the runtime permission (see below). The
* naming convention follows the hierarchical property naming convention.
* Also, an asterisk
* may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to
* signify a wildcard match. For example: "loadLibrary.*" or "*" is valid,
* "*loadLibrary" or "a*b" is not valid.
* <P>
* The following table lists all the possible RuntimePermission target names,
* and for each provides a description of what the permission allows
* and a discussion of the risks of granting code the permission.
* <P>
*
* <table border=1 cellpadding=5 summary="permission target name,
* what the target allows,and associated risks">
* <tr>
* <th>Permission Target Name</th>
* <th>What the Permission Allows</th>
* <th>Risks of Allowing this Permission</th>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>createClassLoader</td>
* <td>Creation of a class loader</td>
* <td>This is an extremely dangerous permission to grant.
* Malicious applications that can instantiate their own class
* loaders could then load their own rogue classes into the system.
* These newly loaded classes could be placed into any protection
* domain by the class loader, thereby automatically granting the
* classes the permissions for that domain.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getClassLoader</td>
* <td>Retrieval of a class loader (e.g., the class loader for the calling
* class)</td>
* <td>This would grant an attacker permission to get the
* class loader for a particular class. This is dangerous because
* having access to a class's class loader allows the attacker to
* load other classes available to that class loader. The attacker
* would typically otherwise not have access to those classes.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setContextClassLoader</td>
* <td>Setting of the context class loader used by a thread</td>
* <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions
* when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system
* class loader. Granting setContextClassLoader permission would allow
* code to change which context class loader is used
* for a particular thread, including system threads.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>enableContextClassLoaderOverride</td>
* <td>Subclass implementation of the thread context class loader methods</td>
* <td>The context class loader is used by system code and extensions
* when they need to lookup resources that might not exist in the system
* class loader. Granting enableContextClassLoaderOverride permission would allow
* a subclass of Thread to override the methods that are used
* to get or set the context class loader for a particular thread.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setSecurityManager</td>
* <td>Setting of the security manager (possibly replacing an existing one)
* </td>
* <td>The security manager is a class that allows
* applications to implement a security policy. Granting the setSecurityManager
* permission would allow code to change which security manager is used by
* installing a different, possibly less restrictive security manager,
* thereby bypassing checks that would have been enforced by the original
* security manager.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>createSecurityManager</td>
* <td>Creation of a new security manager</td>
* <td>This gives code access to protected, sensitive methods that may
* disclose information about other classes or the execution stack.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getenv.{variable name}</td>
* <td>Reading of the value of the specified environment variable</td>
* <td>This would allow code to read the value, or determine the
* existence, of a particular environment variable. This is
* dangerous if the variable contains confidential data.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>exitVM</td>
* <td>Halting of the Java Virtual Machine</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to mount a denial-of-service attack
* by automatically forcing the virtual machine to halt.
* Note: The "exitVM" permission is automatically granted to all code
* loaded from the application class path, thus enabling applications
* to terminate themselves.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>shutdownHooks</td>
* <td>Registration and cancellation of virtual-machine shutdown hooks</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious shutdown
* hook that interferes with the clean shutdown of the virtual machine.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setFactory</td>
* <td>Setting of the socket factory used by ServerSocket or Socket,
* or of the stream handler factory used by URL</td>
* <td>This allows code to set the actual implementation
* for the socket, server socket, stream handler, or RMI socket factory.
* An attacker may set a faulty implementation which mangles the data
* stream.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setIO</td>
* <td>Setting of System.out, System.in, and System.err</td>
* <td>This allows changing the value of the standard system streams.
* An attacker may change System.in to monitor and
* steal user input, or may set System.err to a "null" OutputStream,
* which would hide any error messages sent to System.err. </td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>modifyThread</td>
* <td>Modification of threads, e.g., via calls to Thread
* <tt>interrupt</tt>, <tt>stop</tt>, <tt>suspend</tt>,
* <tt>resume</tt>, <tt>setDaemon</tt>, <tt>setPriority</tt>,
* <tt>setName</tt> and <tt>setUncaughtExceptionHandler</tt>
* methods</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to modify the behaviour of
* any thread in the system.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>stopThread</td>
* <td>Stopping of threads via calls to the Thread <code>stop</code>
* method</td>
* <td>This allows code to stop any thread in the system provided that it is
* already granted permission to access that thread.
* This poses as a threat, because that code may corrupt the system by
* killing existing threads.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>modifyThreadGroup</td>
* <td>modification of thread groups, e.g., via calls to ThreadGroup
* <code>destroy</code>, <code>getParent</code>, <code>resume</code>,
* <code>setDaemon</code>, <code>setMaxPriority</code>, <code>stop</code>,
* and <code>suspend</code> methods</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to create thread groups and
* set their run priority.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getProtectionDomain</td>
* <td>Retrieval of the ProtectionDomain for a class</td>
* <td>This allows code to obtain policy information
* for a particular code source. While obtaining policy information
* does not compromise the security of the system, it does give
* attackers additional information, such as local file names for
* example, to better aim an attack.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>readFileDescriptor</td>
* <td>Reading of file descriptors</td>
* <td>This would allow code to read the particular file associated
* with the file descriptor read. This is dangerous if the file
* contains confidential data.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>writeFileDescriptor</td>
* <td>Writing to file descriptors</td>
* <td>This allows code to write to a particular file associated
* with the descriptor. This is dangerous because it may allow
* malicious code to plant viruses or at the very least, fill up
* your entire disk.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>loadLibrary.{library name}</td>
* <td>Dynamic linking of the specified library</td>
* <td>It is dangerous to allow an applet permission to load native code
* libraries, because the Java security architecture is not designed to and
* does not prevent malicious behavior at the level of native code.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>accessClassInPackage.{package name}</td>
* <td>Access to the specified package via a class loader's
* <code>loadClass</code> method when that class loader calls
* the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageAccess</code> method</td>
* <td>This gives code access to classes in packages
* to which it normally does not have access. Malicious code
* may use these classes to help in its attempt to compromise
* security in the system.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>defineClassInPackage.{package name}</td>
* <td>Definition of classes in the specified package, via a class
* loader's <code>defineClass</code> method when that class loader calls
* the SecurityManager <code>checkPackageDefinition</code> method.</td>
* <td>This grants code permission to define a class
* in a particular package. This is dangerous because malicious
* code with this permission may define rogue classes in
* trusted packages like <code>java.security</code> or <code>java.lang</code>,
* for example.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>accessDeclaredMembers</td>
* <td>Access to the declared members of a class</td>
* <td>This grants code permission to query a class for its public,
* protected, default (package) access, and private fields and/or
* methods. Although the code would have
* access to the private and protected field and method names, it would not
* have access to the private/protected field data and would not be able
* to invoke any private methods. Nevertheless, malicious code
* may use this information to better aim an attack.
* Additionally, it may invoke any public methods and/or access public fields
* in the class. This could be dangerous if
* the code would normally not be able to invoke those methods and/or
* access the fields because
* it can't cast the object to the class/interface with those methods
* and fields.
</td>
* </tr>
* <tr>
* <td>queuePrintJob</td>
* <td>Initiation of a print job request</td>
* <td>This could print sensitive information to a printer,
* or simply waste paper.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>getStackTrace</td>
* <td>Retrieval of the stack trace information of another thread.</td>
* <td>This allows retrieval of the stack trace information of
* another thread. This might allow malicious code to monitor the
* execution of threads and discover vulnerabilities in applications.</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>setDefaultUncaughtExceptionHandler</td>
* <td>Setting the default handler to be used when a thread
* terminates abruptly due to an uncaught exception</td>
* <td>This allows an attacker to register a malicious
* uncaught exception handler that could interfere with termination
* of a thread</td>
* </tr>
*
* <tr>
* <td>preferences</td>
* <td>Represents the permission required to get access to the
* java.util.prefs.Preferences implementations user or system root
* which in turn allows retrieval or update operations within the
* Preferences persistent backing store.) </td>
* <td>This permission allows the user to read from or write to the
* preferences backing store if the user running the code has
* sufficient OS privileges to read/write to that backing store.
* The actual backing store may reside within a traditional filesystem
* directory or within a registry depending on the platform OS</td>
* </tr>
* </table>
*
* @see java.security.BasicPermission
* @see java.security.Permission
* @see java.security.Permissions
* @see java.security.PermissionCollection
* @see java.lang.SecurityManager
*
* @version 1.53 04/04/20
*
* @author Marianne Mueller
* @author Roland Schemers
*/
public final class RuntimePermission extends BasicPermission {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 7399184964622342223L;
/**
* Creates a new RuntimePermission with the specified name.
* The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, such as
* "exit", "setFactory", etc. An asterisk
* may appear at the end of the name, following a ".", or by itself, to
* signify a wildcard match.
*
* @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.
*/
public RuntimePermission(String name)
{
super(name);
}
/**
* Creates a new RuntimePermission object with the specified name.
* The name is the symbolic name of the RuntimePermission, and the
* actions String is currently unused and should be null.
*
* @param name the name of the RuntimePermission.
* @param actions should be null.
*/
public RuntimePermission(String name, String actions)
{
super(name, actions);
}
}
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